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Abstract
Individuals engage in conspicuous consumption to signal
their income to their own reference groups, defined in a fine
manner by observable identifiers such as race, gender, education,
and occupation. The more income inequality within a refer-
ence group, the less prior information concerning the income
of an individual, and hence the more effective the conspicuous
consumption signal. Therefore, within-group income inequality
causes substitution from non-conspicuous consumption to con-
spicuous consumption. We find strong evidence supporting this
prediction regarding aggregate conspicuous consumption for all
income percentiles. Disaggregating into smaller consumption
categories, most consumption items categorized by the previ-
ous literature as conspicuous and non-conspicuous using survey
methods agrees with this prediction as well.
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1 Introduction
Rather than consuming directly for one’s well-being, people may
consume to influence the public perception of their well-being instead.
This second kind of consumption, known as conspicuous consumption,
serves to signal for status — through conspicuous consumption, one
can reveal himself as having high income to the public. Conspicuous
consumption, as a means of signaling rather than just for its intrinsic
value, can crowd out non-conspicuous consumption, sometimes to
an extreme that draws the attention of many economists. This paper
studies the substitution between these two kinds of consumption, and
relates that to income inequality within one’s reference group, defined
by observables such as occupation, race, gender, age, and education
level.
This substitution effect applies to reference groups at all income
levels. Consider two featuring examples. One reference group of inter-
est consists of farmers in the developing countries, who spend 10%
of their annual budget on festivals (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).1 Moti-
vated by this finding, Neeman et al. (2012) constructs a conspicuous
consumption model in which the poor signals their wealth through
conspicuous consumption. Whereas the rich is the original focus of
the conspicuous consumption literature founded by Veblen (1899). As
another featuring reference group, NFL players are reported to spend
conspicuously during their career, yet they file bankruptcies soon after
retirement.2
1Banerjee and Duflo (2007) reports:
Yet the average person living at under $1 per day does not seem to
put every available penny into buying more calories. Among our 13
countries, food typically represents from 56 to 78 percent among rural
households, and 56 to 74 percent in urban areas. For the rural poor
in Mexico, slightly less than half the budget (49.6 percent) allocated
to purchase food. (...) Perhaps more surprisingly, it is apparent that
spending on festivals is an important part of the budget for many
extremely poor households. (...) The median household spent 10
percent of its annual budget on festivals.
2Carlson et al. (2015) reports,
A career lasting 6 years (the median length) will provide an NFL player
with more earnings than an average college graduate will get in an
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These two reference groups, which we take as leading examples,
are clearly distinct by occupation — knowing a person being an NFL
player easily distinguish him from a farmer in a developing country.
More generally, the public would use observable group identifiers
as predictors of an individual’s income, before using conspicuous
consumption as an indirect means of inference. This conditioning,
though, do not explain all the aggregate income inequality in earnings
regressions; a significant portion of the variation in income is within-
group. A large macro literature reports on the wage dispersion among
observationally homogeneous workers (Hall and Mueller, 2017).3
In this paper, we claim that within-group income inequality is
related to conspicuous consumption. To this end, we build and test a
simple model of conspicuous consumption that hinges on a straight-
forward application of Bayes’ theorem. In this model, the public infers
an agent’s income by first conditioning on observables that defines
his reference group; this prior, as the within-group income inequality,
is non-degenerate. As Bayes’ theorem dictates, the public spread its
updating weights on the prior and a conspicuous consumption signal
sent by the agent.
Suppose that the income inequality within his reference group
increases; now it becomes harder to determine his income a priori
because of a more diffused prior. Being less informed, the public
puts a higher weight on the conspicuous consumption signal. His
conspicuous consumption, with increased influence to the public
inference process, would increase in the expense of non-conspicuous
consumption.
We then extend this analysis to include dynamics. Even in a world
without capital markets, conspicuous consumption establishes an
entire lifetime, plus a modest pension. However, earnings are risky
because an injury can cut a player’s career short. (...) Indeed, we find
that initial bankruptcy filings begin to occur very soon after retirement
and continue at a substantial rate through at least the first 12 years of
retirement (Carlson et al., 2015).
3For our two reference group examples, harvest income is idiosyncratic among
farmers, partly due their low mobility causing difficulties in avoiding geographic
risks such as bad weather (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006, 2009); while the income
distribution of NFL players is highly skewed due to the presence of superstars
(Rosen, 1981).
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intertemporal link because signaling for status today also have effects
on future inferences, in case income is persistent. The cumulative
signaling effects leads to more conspicuous consumption relative to
the i.i.d. case.
In our empirical exercise, we examine this implication by compar-
ing across reference groups, which differ in within-group income in-
equality. We discover that conspicuous consumption and within-group
inequality are positively related for all permanent income percentiles;
the reverse conclusion holds true for non-conspicuous consumption.
In making this comparison, we control for mean permanent income
of the group, in order to hold the average purchasing power within a
reference group constant.
Some confounding factors may undermine the validity of this com-
parison. First, reference groups may have heterogeneous preferences
— some groups may particularly prefer certain goods that economists
regard as conspicuous consumption, such as clothing and jewelry,
without an intention of being conspicuous. Second, reference groups
may also have different persistence in income, which we have shown
to affect the demand for conspicuous consumption. To address these
identification concerns, we divide the references groups further by
year to obtain a short panel of groups; using this panel, we perform
the same exercise controlling for group and year fixed effects, and
the results still hold. The identifying assumption is that preferences
and persistence are time-invariant, while price changes over time are
common across the reference groups, and thus being absorbed by the
time trend.
We make four remarks about our main result. First, based on our
theory, we define reference groups using a vector of characteristics
typically considered in wage regressions. We arrive at a large number
of reference groups relative to the existing literature, which focus on
prescribed single criterion such as race (Charles et al., 2009; Kaus,
2013) or gender (Griskevicius et al., 2007).
Second, according to the permanent income hypothesis (PIH),
consumption should depend on permanent income, while in cross-
sectional data permanent income is hard to directly identify. If PIH
holds, then the total current expenditure of each period should be
equal to permanent income. Following Charles et al. (2009), we proxy
permanent income by current total expenditure. This proxying implies
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that both mean permanent income and within-group inequality are
measured with error. Under a classical measurement error assumption,
the resulting attenuation bias would drive the estimated correlations
towards zero. Since our tests are to reject the null of zero correlation,
the attenuation bias results in a more stringent test.4
Third, our main result is established using aggregate conspicuous
consumption defined by Charles et al. (2009). As an extension, we
evaluate whether each of the consumption items used by Charles et al.
(2009) shows their expected correlations, i.e. positive for conspicuous
consumption, negative for non-conspicuous consumption. We find
that the correlation coefficient for most consumption items have their
respective expected signs, even though there are partial exceptions.
Among non-conspicuous items in Charles et al. (2009), food, rent,
utility and health show negative correlations as expected; however,
entertainment is shown to be conspicuous for all income percentiles,
whereas travel is conspicuous only for the rich. Among conspicuous
items in Charles et al. (2009), while cars has positive correlations as
expected, clothing and personal care occupy insignificant consumption
shares; consequently, they show almost zero correlations with income
inequality. On the whole, our prediction is consistent with the survey-
based categorization.
Fourth, we repeat the exercise using data from Vietnam, a devel-
oping country, to corroborate our findings. The consumption pattern
of Vietnamese are different from that of people of the United States,
whom the main sample is drawn from. The mean level of income and
other group-defining characteristics are also different. Nonetheless,
we do observe a similar conclusion.
2 Literature Review
The modern literature on conspicuous consumption formalizes the
arguments exposited in Veblen (1899)’s theory of the social class, which
defines conspicuous consumption as the consumption for status. In
most models of consumption, the utility function depends directly
4Identifying the true causal effect of income inequality requires searching for
exogeneous instruments for both mean permanent income and within-group income
inequality, which are hard to come by; this important task is left for future exercises.
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on the amount of consumption. Conspicuous consumption models
depart from the standard model by including social status as part of
the utility function. Specifically, social status refers to how the society
regard the well-being of an individual.
Ireland (1994); Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) build the canonical
model of conspicuous consumption.5 This canonical model is an ap-
plication of signaling models to the consumption context. The rich
have an incentive to reveal themselves as rich using conspicuous con-
sumption as a signal, distinguishing thsemelves from the poor. Like
Spence (1973)’s classical signaling model on education, the result is a
separating equilibrium — the rich spends sufficiently much on conspic-
uous consumption until the poor cannot follow suit; whereas the poor
would optimally give up altogether in engaging in conspicuous con-
sumption, since an insufficient amount of conspicuous consumption
cannot alter the public inference.
Notably, in a separating equilibrium the inference process is de-
generate, since the types are fully revealed; the public completely
disregard the prior distribution on the types. Whereas in our model,
conspicuous consumption sends a noisy signal of income to the public
— it would be difficult to quickly access the value of a luxury good by
merely observing it. As the noise mingles the signals, the public no
longer completely disregard the prior. Hence within-group income
inequality, as the prior, matters.
The theoretical literature considers a number of issues regard-
ing conspicuous consumption which we abstract from. Bagwell and
Bernheim (1996) consider a general equilibrium model and study the
conditions for the existence of Veblen effects. They also show that the
equilibrium is inefficient. Neeman et al. (2012) consider an overlap-
ping generation model with human capital investment, proving that
conspicuous consumption can lead to a poverty trap.
Charles et al. (2009), in their study of conspicuous consumption
by race, mention that between-race heterogeneity in preferences can
explain any between-race difference in consumption levels, but the
resulting theory is tautological. Instead, they abstract from preferences
and emphasize differences in income instead. They find that a Black
person has a less incentive to engage in conspicuous consumption than
5See also Cole et al. (1992, 1995); Glazer and Konrad (1996).
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a White person with comparable income. To explain this fact, they
propose that people in each race signals within their own reference
group. Since Blacks are poorer than Whites on average, a Black person,
being relatively rich within his group, would signal more; whereas
a comparable White person, being relatively poor within his group,
would signal less. Kaus (2013) performs a similar exercise using data
from South Africa. Our paper is related to theirs by extending the
analysis to many finely defined reference groups instead of two.
Conspicuous consumption are often considered as irrational, which
invites lack of self-control as another candidate explanation of the same
phenomenon. For instance, Carlson et al. (2015) appeal to the lack of
self-control to explain why the NFL players do not save during their
career. Most self-control models consider a single consumption good,
thus abstracting from the concern of substitution between conspicu-
ous and non-conspicuous goods. As a notable exception, Banerjee
and Mullainathan (2010) consider a theoretical model in which they
define temptation goods as those which generate positive utility to
the self which consumes the good, but not to the previous selves that
anticipates the consumption.
3 The Model
3.1 Static Case
For simplicity, we first consider a static economy. There is a continuum
of agents indexed by i ∈ I . Agent i’s income is an endowment yi ∈ R+,
being log-normally i.i.d. distributed such that log(yi) ∼ N(my, 1/hy),
where hy > 0 is a precision parameter (the inverse of variance). The
public does not know the realization of yi but only its distribution.
For a particular agent i, ci ∈ R+ is his non-conspicuous (ordinary)
consumption, and vi is his conspicuous consumption. Conspicuous
consumption vi ∈ R+ does not enter the utility function directly, so
that it has no intrinsic consumption value; it can be used to manipulate
his status si ∈ R+ according to an updating rule S : R+ → R such
that si = S(vi). The status, as we shall specify later, represents the
public posterior mean of agent i’s income. Shutting down the intrinsic
value of conspicuous consumption vi is not necessary but rather for
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exposition; we highlight that even in this case, the demand for status
implies a strictly positive value of conspicuous consumption.
Agent i’s utility is quasi-linear in non-conspicuous consumption:
U(ci, vi) ≡ log ci + bS(vi) (1)
This functional form is assumed for obtaining a closed-form solution.
Denote the prices of (ci, vi) by (pc, pv) ∈ R2+. The budget set of the
agent is B(yi) = {(c, v) ∈ R2+|pcc+ pvv ≤ yi}. Given {pc, pv, yi, S},
agent i solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
(ci,vi)∈B(yi)
U(ci, vi) (2)
which yields policy functions rc(yi), rv(yi) for ci, vi respectively.
The updating rule S is to be determined in the equilibrium. The
public observes a noisy signal of log conspicuous consumption of
agent i:
qi = log vi + εi (3)
where εi ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1/hε) is a noise term, known to the agent but not
to the public; the agent has no control over εi. The public knows agent
i’s policy function of vi, and hence qi is indirectly a function of yi —
to the public, observing qi is informative on yi. On the other hand,
non-conspicuous consumption ci is not observable to the public.
Given the assumed functional forms, there is a simple solution to
this problem. Assume that the updating rule S takes a form of:
S(v) = s0 log(v); s0 ∈ R (4)
In this case, the policy functions are linear in y as rc(yi) = rcyi, rv(yi) =
rvyi, where rc = 1/[pc(1+ bs0)], rv = bs1/[pv(1+ bs0)].
In the equilibrium, the public would first adjust the signal on log
conspicuous consumption by an amount of − log rv, such that the
adjusted signal is the log income plus noise q˜i = log(yi) + εi. Then
the public uses Bayes’ rule to determine agent i’s status, which takes
the form of an weighted average of its prior mean and the adjusted
signal as:
si ≡ myφ+ q˜i(1− φ) (5)
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where φ ∈ [0, 1] is the updating weight put on the prior mean my, and
1− φ is the updating weight put on the adjusted signal. According to
Bayes’ rule,
φ =
hy
hy + hε
(6)
so that the weight on the prior depends on the relative precision of
the prior and the signal.
Taking this updating rule as given, for agent i his marginal effect
of signal manipulation using conspicuous consumption is:
∂si
∂vi
=
∂si
∂q˜i
∂qi
∂vi
=
1− φ
v
(7)
which agrees with the assumed log functional form of the updating
rule S, with s0 = 1− φ. This implies that rc = 11+b(1−φ) , rv =
b(1−φ)
1+b(1−φ) .
Our model includes that of noiseless signaling as a special case,
such that hε = ∞, φ = 0, and that rc = 1/(1 + b), rv = b/(1 + b).
In this special case, the prior is completely discarded in Bayesian
updating; consequently, within-group income inequality hy has zero
impact on conspicuous consumption. Hence for our theory to hold,
the signaling noise is key.
Whereas the opposite case is that hε = 0 such that the raw signal
is pure noise, then φ = 1 and rc = 1, rv = 0; in this case where
conspicuous consumption cannot be valued by the public, then there
can be no conspicuous consumption.6
It is straightforward to obtain the following comparative statics:
Proposition 1 (Comparative Statics). ∂rc/∂hε < 0, ∂rv/∂hε > 0, ∂rc/∂hy >
0, ∂rv/∂hy < 0, ∂rc/∂b < 0, ∂rv/∂b > 0.
Proposition 1 states that within-group income inequality causes
substitution from non-conspicuous consumption to conspicuous con-
sumption. Specifically, consider two groups A and B with the same
group mean income myA = myB, but Group A has a larger within-
group inequality relative to Group B such that hyA < hyB. Proposition
6Certainly, if the conspicuous good has intrinsic value, then its consumption is
still positive.
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1 would imply that Group A will spend more on conspicuous con-
sumption relative to Group B. This is the main proposition that we
are going to test.
3.2 Multiple Goods Model
It is straightforward to generalize the above to consider multiple
goods. Now goods are indexed by j ∈ J ≡ {1, 2, . . . , J}, and denote
the vector of all goods of agent i as ci ∈ RJ+. Let the vector of prices
be p ∈ RJ+. The budget set is B(yi) ≡ {c ∈ RJ+|p′c ≤ yi}. Each good
agent i consumes has a different signaling noise; we denote the vector
by εi ∈ RJ ; we assume that εi ∼ N(0, E) where E ≡ diag(1/h) is a
diagonal matrix to impose independence across goods. Utility is given
by:
U(ci) ≡ ∑
j∈J
aj log(cij) + bS(ci) (8)
where S : RJ+ → R is the updating rule that depends on the consump-
tion of all goods, which we assume the following form:
S(c) = ∑
j∈J
sj log(cj); sj ∈ R+, ∀j ∈ J (9)
The first-order conditions for cij for a particular good j ∈ J is:
aj + bsj
c
= λpj (10)
so that c∗ij = rjyi, where rj = (aj + bsj)/[pj ∑j′∈J (aj′ + bsj′)].
The public receives the signals qi = log(ci) + εi = r+ log(yi)1+ εi,
where r = (r1, r2, . . . , rJ) ∈ RJ+. The adjusted signals are: q˜i = qi − r.
Since the signals are independent, Bayes’ rule imply that:
sit = φ0my + ∑
j∈J
φjq˜ij (11)
where
φ0 =
hy
hy +∑j∈J hj
; φj =
hj
hy +∑j∈J hj
, ∀j ∈ J (12)
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Using the same reasoning as the two-good case,
pjrj =
aj + bφj
∑j′∈J aj′ + bφ′j
(13)
Consider the ratio of two goods A, B ∈ J . Their ratio of consumption
expenditure is pArApBrB =
aA+bφA
aB+bφB
and that φA/φB = hA/hB = cφ ∈ R+.
Suppose that good A is a better conspicuous good, such that its is
more observable to the public, with hA > hB such that cφ > 1.
When within-group inequality rises, hy decreases so φA, φB in-
creases while maintaining their ratio cφ. Since:
∂
∂φB
[
aA + bcφφB
aB + bφB
] =
b(aBcφ − aA)
(aB + bφB)2
(14)
This implies that if two goods have the same intrinsic value such that
aA = aB, then the ratio of consumption expenditure increases since
cφ > 1.
3.3 Infinite-Period Model
The one-period model ignores an important concern that, if learn-
ing is allowed for multiple periods, then eventually the income of
the agent will become perfectly known to the public; therefore, it is
not possible to sustain conspicuous consumption at the steady state,
even in the presence of a non-degenerate cross-sectional within-group
heterogeneity. This observation is shared in Holmstro¨m (1999) as well.
As the next step, we consider a dynamic extension of the baseline in
which the current income of an agent stochastically evolves over time.
We shut down the credit market here so there is no direct intertemporal
trade-off. We show that even in this case, the conspicuous consumption
is non-zero; furthermore, conspicuous consumption can generally
affect future status when income is persistent. Thus an intertemporal
link exists.
At any time t ∈ T where T is the set of integers, agent i’s income
yit is given by:
yit = Zitηit (15)
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such that Zit is known and ηit is an log-normally distributed innovation
unknown to the public. This innovation follows a log AR(1) process
that starts from the infinite past:
log ηit = ρ log ηit−1 + ξit (16)
where ξit ∼i.i.d. N(0, 1/hξ), ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a persistence parameter.
The sequence problem at time t = t∗ is:
max
ct∗ ,vt∗
Et[
∞
∑
t=t∗
βτ[log(ct) + St(vt, vt−1, . . .)]] (17)
where ct∗ ≡ {ct}∞t=t∗ , vt∗ ≡ {vt}∞t=t∗ ; in every period t, (ct, vt) ∈
B(yt) ≡ {(c, v)|pcc + pvv = yt}; β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor;
prices (pc, pv) are constants.
Although the budget set B(yt) has no intertemporal link, cur-
rent status is generally affected by not only the current conspicuous
consumption, but the past conspicuous consumptions as well; the
economy is assumed to be stationary, and that the sequence of past
conspicuous consumption up to time t∗ is an infinite series.
The updating rule at time t, St, is assumed to take the following
form, which shall be justified:
St(vt, vt−1, . . .) =
∞
∑
τ=0
sτ log(vt−τ) (18)
The first-order conditions for (ct, vt) for any t ≥ t∗ are:
1
ct
= λpc (19)
b∑∞τ=0 β
τst−τ
vt
= λ (20)
Which means that the solution is still in the form of c∗i = rcyit, v
∗
i =
rvyit as constant proportions of current income.
As before, the second step is to determine the equilibrium updating
rule. The public constructs the adjusted signal of current income for
each period as:
q˜it = qit − log rv = logZit + log νit + εit (21)
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At time t, agent i’s status depends on the public perception given
the history of adjusted signals q˜ti ≡ {q˜iτ}t−∞. Because of the AR(1)
structure of innovations, past adjusted signals are informative on
current income. Consequently, the status sit is determined by the
Bayes’ rule according to the following:
sit = logZit +E[log νit|q˜ti ]
= logZit +E
[
∞
∑
τ=0
ρτξit−τ|q˜ti
]
= logZit +
∞
∑
τ=0
ρτE[ξit−τ|q˜it−τ]
= logZit +
∞
∑
τ=0
ρτ(1− φ)q˜it−τ (22)
where
φ =
hη
hη + hε
=
(1− ρ2)hξ
(1− ρ2)hξ + hε (23)
Therefore, we have st−τ = ρτ(1− φ) for any τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and
S′(v) = ∑
∞
τ=0 β
τρτ(1− φ)
v
=
1− φ
(1− βρ)v (24)
which is strictly positive. In turn, it implies that
rc =
1
pc[1+ b(1− φ)/(1− βρ)] , rv =
b(1− φ)/(1− βρ)
pv[1+ b(1− φ)/(1− βρ)] (25)
This result implies that conspicuous consumption is more prevalent
in reference groups that have a high persistence parameter in their
earnings — these reference groups are typically having random-walk
like income paths and are perceived as risky.
If ρ = 0, income is i.i.d., with hη = hξ , φ = hξ/(hξ + hε), and
rv =
b(1− φ)
pv(1+ b(1− φ))
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In this case, learning about the income of agent i in one period has no
prediction power to his income in another period. This i.i.d. feature
prevents the public to fully learn about agent i’s income, and hence
conspicuous consumption is effective even in the long run.
If ρ → 1, the income process approaches a random walk. In this
case, φ → 0 since the within-group income inequality explodes. In
this case, and
rv → b/(1− β)pv[1+ b/(1− β)]
We plot rv as a function of ρ, setting hξ = hε = 1 = b = pv = 1 to
visualize the relationship for intermediate values of ρ in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Relationship between ρ and rv
We summarize the above in the following proposition
Proposition 2 (Persistence). ∂rv/∂ρ > 0, ∂rc/∂ρ < 0. As the persistence
parameter ρ increases, conspicuous consumption becomes more useful since
its manipulation effect persists over time. The result is substitution from
non-conspicuous consumption to conspicuous consumption.
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4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Construction of Reference Groups
Following Charles et al. (2009), we are indebted use their publicly
available data set produced using the Consumption Expenditure Sur-
vey (CEX) to establish these claims. Hence here we describe only the
essentials about the raw data here; the reader is referred to Charles
et al. (2009) for details.
[We later supplement it by another data set about farmers in Viet-
nam, a developing country. ]
The CEX reports how the Americans consume. Specifically, the
CEX provides information on consumer buying habits, incomes, and
expenditures, as well as characteristics of households. The main
advantage of CEX is its vast number of consumption items. Since the
primary purpose of the CEX is to construct consumption weights for
inflation adjustment, the Bureau of Labor Statistics spends significant
effort in guaranteeing its quality.
In constrast, the income measure in CEX is unreliable. Charles et al.
(2009) report that 27% of the households have their income missing,
and the CEX does not impute missing data. The income distribution
obtained from the CEX does not match that of better data sets in this
aspect either, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS).
To address this problem, Charles et al. (2009) proxy permanent
income by total expenditure. The idea is that according to permanent
income hypothesis (or life-cycle hypothesis in a finite horizon setting),
a rational household, with perfect self-insurance, should amortize his
present value of all income equally to guarantee smooth consumption
over all periods. Consequently, the amortized present value —the
permanent income— should be equal to the total expenditure in
any period. We follow their approach and use total expenditure to
approximate permanent income.
As discussed in the introduction, we aggregate over households
and construct reference groups defined by a vector of household
characteristics, in order to capture the publicly predictable component
of permanent income. We consider household characteristics that are
typically considered in wage regressions (gender, age, race, education,
occupation). Given our fine definition of groups, some groups are
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unavoidably being too small to construct a reliable estimate of the
group mean and variance. Therefore we select the groups that are
above 10 observations, which is close to the first quartile in terms of
group size.
For each group, we evaluate within-group inequality as its log co-
efficient of variation (within-group variance normalized by the mean).
To get a sense of how within-group inequality distributes across
reference groups, Table 1 sorts the constructed reference groups by
permanent income inequality, and report the average group-defining
characteristics (gender, age, race, education) for each inequality quar-
tile. The young, female have more income inequality on average,
while there is no clear pattern with respect to race or education (with
a scale of 1-4). The relationship is particularly obvious for gender: the
1st inequality quartile consists of almost entirely males, whereas the
reverse is true for the 4th inequality quartile.
The reverse relationship holds with respect to permanent income.
The richest reference groups are on average older and male-dominated.
See Table 2.
Given these opposing correlations, it is unsurprising that without
proper control of permanent income to keep purchasing power con-
stant, conspicuous consumption by age and gender do not have a
monotonic relationship. See Table 3.
Within-Group Income Inequality Age Male White Education
1st Quartile 61.27 0.95 0.62 2.23
2nd Quartile 48.11 0.72 0.47 2.33
3rd Quartile 50.56 0.28 0.54 2.25
4th Quartile 38.65 0.02 0.49 2.36
Table 1: Group-Defining Characteristics by Inequality Quartile
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Mean Permanent Income Age Male White Education
1st Quartile 37.80 0.02 0.46 2.39
2nd Quartile 50.78 0.27 0.55 2.17
3rd Quartile 48.41 0.73 0.50 2.37
4th Quartile 61.68 0.95 0.61 2.23
Table 2: Group-Defining Characteristics by Permanent Income Quartile
Conspicuous Consumption Share Age Male White Education
1st Quartile 43.30 0.06 0.47 2.35
2nd Quartile 50.61 0.48 0.51 2.33
3rd Quartile 53.37 0.78 0.58 2.30
4th Quartile 51.34 0.65 0.56 2.18
Table 3: Group-Defining Characteristics by Conspicuous Consumption
Quartile
In our main analysis, we first sort our reference groups by per-
manent income. For each permanent income percentile, we compute
the average expenditure shares of conspicuous consumption and non-
conspicuous consumption. Figure 2 shows that the expenditure on
conspicuous consumption is almost a constant fraction of 8-10% of per-
manent income. Notably, the very poor in the United States maintain
their conspicuous consumption, much like the farmers in developmen-
tal countries. Whereas the very rich in the United States, generally
speaking, are not particularly conspicuous in relative terms.
Next, we match groups by permanent income, and compare matched
groups whose income inequality and conspicuous consumption differ.
Figure 3 plots the conditional correlation of consumption shares and
income inequality (in logs) by permanent income percentile.
To compute the conditional correlation
Corr(C, In|PI)
where C stands for log consumption share, In stands for inequality,
and PI stands for permanent income, we first run a regression:
Cg = β0 + β1Ing + β2PIg + β3PIg ∗ Ing + εg (26)
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Figure 2: Consumption Expenditure Shares by Permanent Income
Percentile (United States)
where g is the group subscript. Given this model,
Corr(C, In|PI) = (β1 + β3PI)Var(In|PI)
sd(C|PI)sd(In|PI) (27)
We then find Var(C|PI) and Var(In|PI) by separately regressing C, In
on PI, obtaining and squaring the residuals, and regress the squared
residuals on PI again. Finally we take square roots to estimate the
standard error terms.
As Figure 3 shows, for all percentiles, conspicuous consumption
is positively correlated to income inequality while non-conspicuous
consumption is negatively correlated to income inequality, agreeing
with our hypothesis.
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Figure 3: Correlation Coefficients of Log Consumption Shares and
Inequality by Permanent Income Percentile (United States)
4.2 Controlling for Heterogeneity
To control for heterogeneous preferences across groups, time-series
variation is needed. Hence we introduce year as a new group-defining
criterion. The result is a panel of groups where each gender ∗ race ∗
age ∗ education reference group has repeated observations by year.
We then run the following OLS regression:
Cgt = β0 + β1Ingt + β2PIgt + µg + λt + εgt (28)
where µg,λt are group and year fixed effects, respectively. Since both
the dependent variable and independent variables are in logs, the
interpretations of the regression coefficients are in terms of percentage
changes.
Table 4 shows the regressions of log consumption expenditure
shares on inequality and mean permanent income. For interpretation,
we normalize both the log consumption shares Cgt and inequality Ingt
to Z-scores, with mean zero and variance 1.
In the second and third columns, we partial out the group and year
fixed effects, in order to control for preference heterogeneity and yearly
macroeconomic fluctuations (including changes in relative prices). For
non-conspicuous consumption, the regression coefficients are negative;
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for conspicuous consumption, the regression coefficients are positive.
Once full controls are introduced, the regression coefficients magnified
in their respective directions.
The fourth column introduces interaction between inequality and
permanent income, which corresponds to the correlation figure above.
When permanent income is below mean (Z-score being negative), the
conditional correlation for conspicuous consumption increases, thus
proving that conspicuous consumption is particularly relevant for the
relatively poor groups, consistent with the correlation by percentile
graph.
Dependent variable:
Conspicuous Consumption (Log Share, Z-score)
(1) (2) (3)
Inequality (Z-score) 0.325∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.179∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.042)
Mean (Z-score) 0.799∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.822∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.825∗∗∗ (0.048)
Interaction −0.057∗∗∗ (0.013)
Group-Defining Dummies No Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 3,020 3,020 3,020
R2 0.249 0.720 0.722
Dependent variable:
Non-Conspicuous Consumption (Log Share, Z-score)
(1) (2) (3)
Inequality (Z-score) −0.567∗∗∗ (0.055) −0.421∗∗∗ (0.057) −0.386∗∗∗ (0.057)
Mean (Z-score) −0.890∗∗∗ (0.055) −1.230∗∗∗ (0.064) −1.230∗∗∗ (0.064)
Interaction 0.104∗∗∗ (0.017)
Group Dummies No Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes Yes
Observations 3,020 3,020 3,020
R2 0.152 0.491 0.498
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4: OLS of Log Consumption Shares on Within-Group Moments
(United States)
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5 Categorizing Conspicuous Items
According to the categorization by of consumption items by Charles
et al. (2009), non-conspicuous consumption is responsible for about
80% of all expenditure. While conspicuous consumption has personal
care, clothing and car expenditures as sub-items.
In Charles et al. (2009), the survey question is in the form of:
Consider a person who lives in a household and commu-
nity roughly similar to yours. How closely would you
have to interact with this person in order to observe that
they consistently spend more than average on each of the
following consumption categories?
Hence by construction, the answer would depend on the community
in which the respondent lives in, who are the graduate students in
University of Chicagos Harris School and Graduate School of Business.
We further investigate if our model holds for each of these items.
We plot their expenditure shares in Figure 4. Food expenditure falls
along the percentiles. Whereas rent, utility and entertainment has
roughly constant expenditure shares. Notably, health expenditure is
very low (less than 5%), because health expenses are idiosyncratic;
most individuals has zero expenses during the month of interview.
After within-group averaging, the group means would be small.
In contrast, conspicuous consumption items is a much smaller cate-
gory. For upper percentiles, car-related expenditure become dominant.
We plot their expenditure shares in Figure 5.
Then we compute the conditional correlations by permanent in-
come percentile for each of these items. The results for non-conspicuous
items are shown in Figure 6. Food, rent, utility has negative correla-
tions, while entertainment and travel shows unexpected signs. Fur-
thermore, entertainment is decreasingly conspicuous, while travel is
increasingly conspicuous.
In Banerjee and Duflo (2007) and Neeman et al. (2012), entertain-
ment, that in festivals in particular, is regarded as conspicuous. As
noted by Banerjee and Duflo (2007) though, there are substantial
differences in the exact form of entertainment among the rich and
poor:
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Figure 4: Expenditure Shares by Group Mean Expenditure (Non-
Conspicuous Items, United States)
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Figure 5: Expenditure Shares by Percentile (Conspicuous Items, United
States)
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The under $1 per day households spend very little on the
forms of entertainment that are common in rich countries,
such as movies, theater, or video shows. In all 13 of the
countries in our sample, in the month preceding the sur-
vey the average extremely poor household spent less than
1 percent on any of these forms of entertainment. The
comparable number for the United States is 5 percent.
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Figure 6: Correlation by Percentile (Non-Conspicuous Items, United
States)
For the conspicuous items, we plot the corresponding correlations
in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Correlation by Percentile (Conspicuous Items, United States)
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between the substitution effect
between conspicuous and non-conspicuous goods, and examine how
it is related to within-group income inequality. As our theory pre-
dicts, within-group inequality generates a need for the consumers
to signal their income to the public, thereby promoting conspicuous
consumption. This prediction is validated from the CEX data, and
that it also agrees with a popular press notion that some particular oc-
cupations with risky income such as being sportstars, tend to involve
in conspicuous consumption. Whereas the same conclusion can hold
for relatively poor reference groups such as farmers in developing
countries.
As a take-away message, signaling for status is a last resort when
other means are not available. This theory predicts that if income
becomes more transparent, then conspicuous consumption would
decrease. As one instance, the salary of some particular professionals,
like economics professors, are essentially known within the reference
group. The welfare benefit of having public information on income
can be enormous. As our model shows that even if conspicuous
consumption has no intrinsic value, the equilibrium action is to engage
in it; if income becomes observable, then all income can be reallocated
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to non-conspicuous consumption.
Another intervention is to introduce risk sharing. For farmers in
developing countries, their risk is largely idiosyncratic. Establishing a
risk sharing agreement between farmers would even out the income
distribution, thereby reducing conspicuous consumption. Hence al-
though risk sharing does not improve the average income of farmers,
it helps the poor in terms of their welfare.
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